
THE MORAL ARCHITECTURE OF DUTY: BRIDGING LIBERAL JUSTICE AND DHARMA-BASED JURISPRUDENCE

R.K. Murali, Banaras Hindu University

ABSTRACT

This research paper examines competing conceptions of justice, moral duty, and the nature of the self through a comparative analysis of major Western political philosophers—John Rawls¹, Aristotle², Robert Nozick³, Immanuel Kant⁴, and Michael Sandel⁵—alongside foundational sources of Hindu jurisprudence and moral philosophy, including the Manusmriti,⁶ the Vedas, the Mahabharata, and the Upanishads. The study explores how different traditions conceptualize justice, rights, merit, moral desert, and the relationship between individual autonomy and social obligation. Western liberal theories, particularly those of Rawls and Nozick, emphasize individual rights, distributive justice, and the neutrality of the state, while Kant grounds justice in universal moral duty derived from rational autonomy. In contrast, Aristotle and Sandel highlight the role of community, virtue, and the purposes of social institutions in defining justice. Hindu jurisprudential texts present a duty-centered framework rooted in Dharma, Karma, and social order, where moral responsibility is shaped by role, cosmic law, and the pursuit of righteousness. By critically comparing these traditions, the paper argues that contemporary debates on justice can be better understood through an integrated perspective that balances individual freedom with moral responsibility and social harmony. The research contributes to jurisprudence and political philosophy by demonstrating how

¹ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, rev. edn., 1999).

² John Dunn, "Locke's Political Philosophy", *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, first published Nov. 9, 2005; substantive revision Oct. 6, 2020, available at: <https://plato.stanford.edu> (last visited on March 30, 2026); Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009).

³ Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (Basic Books, New York, 1974).

⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998).

⁵ Michael J. Sandel, *Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2009).

⁶ G. Bühler (trans.), *The Laws of Manu* (Internet Sacred Text Archive), available at: <https://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/manu.htm> (last visited on Feb. 7, 2025); F. Max Müller (trans.), *XXXII Vedic Hymns, Part I*; *Sacred Books of the East* (Internet Sacred Text Archive, 2008), available at: <https://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/sbe32/index.htm> (last visited on Feb. 7, 2025); Hermann Oldenberg (trans.), *XLVI Vedic Hymns, Part II, Sacred Books of the East* (Internet Sacred Text Archive, 1897), available at: <https://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/sbe46/index.htm> (last visited on Feb. 7, 2025); Swami Madhavananda (trans.); *The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad* (Advaita Ashrama), available at: <https://www.advaitaashrama.org> (last visited on Feb. 7, 2025).

diverse philosophical systems address enduring questions about fairness, authority, merit, and the moral foundations of law across cultural and historical contexts.

Keywords: Justice as Fairness. Natural, Categorical Imperative, Teleological Ethics, Libertarianism, Communitarianism, Moral Desert, Political Obligation, Moral Autonomy, Social Contract, Virtue Ethics.

I. Introduction: The Concept of Duty in Moral and Legal Philosophy

The concept of duty occupies a central place in moral philosophy, jurisprudence, and social organization across civilizations. It represents the binding force that regulates human conduct, shapes legal obligations, and sustains social order. In both Western and Eastern traditions, duty is understood not merely as a legal requirement but as a moral imperative that guides individuals in fulfilling their responsibilities toward society, authority, and the moral law. Philosophers such as **Immanuel Kant** emphasized duty as the foundation of morality grounded in rational obligation, while thinkers like **Aristotle** linked duty to virtue and the proper functioning of social institutions. Modern political theorists including **John Rawls**, **Robert Nozick**, and **Michael Sandel** have further debated the relationship between duty, justice, rights, and community. Similarly, ancient Indian jurisprudential sources such as the **Manusmriti**, the **Vedas**, the **Mahabharata**, and the **Upanishads** conceptualize duty in the form of *Dharma*, a comprehensive principle encompassing moral responsibility, social order, and cosmic harmony.

The term “duty” has been defined in various authoritative dictionaries, reflecting its moral, legal, and social dimensions. According to **Webster’s 1913 Dictionary**, duty is defined as “that which a person is bound by moral obligation to do, or refrain from doing; that which one ought to do; service morally obligatory.” This definition emphasizes the normative character of duty as an obligation rooted in moral responsibility rather than mere convenience. Webster further explains that duty may refer to any assigned service or business, such as the duties of a soldier or public official, and highlights the idea of obedience and submission owed to parents, superiors, and authority. In addition, the dictionary recognizes duty in a legal and economic sense, referring to taxes or customs imposed by government authority. These multiple meanings illustrate that duty functions simultaneously as a moral requirement, a professional responsibility, and a legal obligation within organized society.

Similarly, the **Oxford Dictionary** defines duty as “a moral or legal obligation; a

responsibility,” thereby reinforcing the idea that duty arises from both ethical expectations and formal rules of law. The **Cambridge Dictionary** further describes duty as “something that you have to do because it is part of your job, or something that you feel is the right thing to do,” highlighting the dual nature of duty as both externally imposed and internally motivated. In legal terminology, duty is understood as an action conformable to the laws that require obedience, yet it may also extend beyond enforceable legal obligations to include moral responsibilities such as self-discipline, respect for others, and devotion to higher principles. Legal scholars have therefore distinguished duty from obligation by noting that while some duties can be enforced by law, others exist as ethical expectations that guide behavior even in the absence of legal sanctions.⁷

The etymology of the word “duty” further clarifies its conceptual significance. The term is derived from the Old French word *dueté*, meaning “that which is owed,” indicating an inherent relationship between duty and indebtedness or responsibility. This linguistic origin reflects the broader philosophical understanding that individuals owe certain actions to society, authority, and moral law. Across cultures, duty has been regarded as the foundation of ethical conduct and social stability. In Western philosophy, duty is often associated with rational autonomy and universal moral principles, while in Hindu jurisprudence it is closely linked to *Dharma*, which prescribes duties based on social role, stage of life, and cosmic order.

Accordingly, this research paper examines the concept of duty as a foundational principle of justice and social organization through a comparative analysis of Western philosophical theories and classical Hindu jurisprudence. By exploring the ideas of Kant, Aristotle, Rawls, Nozick, and Sandel alongside the teachings found in the Manusmriti, Vedas, Mahabharata, and Upanishads, the study seeks to understand how different intellectual traditions conceptualize moral obligation, responsibility, and the proper conduct of individuals within society. The paper argues that despite cultural and historical differences, the notion of duty remains a universal principle that underpins law, morality, and governance, providing a framework for balancing individual freedom with social responsibility.

⁷ Webster, *American Dictionary of the English Language* (1828), available at: <https://webster-dictionary.org/definition/duty> (last visited on March 30, 2026); Cambridge University Press, *Cambridge Dictionary*, “Duty”, available at: <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/duty> (last visited on March 30, 2026); Oxford University Press, *Oxford English Dictionary*, “Duty”, available at: https://www.oed.com/dictionary/duty_n (last visited on March 30, 2026).

Philosophical Foundations of Duty in Western Jurisprudence

II. Rawls on Duty

John Rawls reconceptualizes the notion of duty within a constitutional-democratic order by grounding it in the architecture of *justice as fairness*,⁸ where the natural duties operate as universally binding moral constraints antecedent to any voluntary act. Rawls describes the *natural duties* as those moral requirements “owed not only to definite individuals... but to persons generally,” holding between all as *equal moral persons* and attaching “independent of... voluntary acts, performative or otherwise”.⁹ Central among these is the *duty of justice*, which obligates each individual “to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us,” and simultaneously to “further just arrangements not yet established” when this may be done without excessive personal cost.¹⁰ Rawls connects this duty to a hypothetical contractarian framework, clarifying that although these principles emerge from the original position, they do **not** presuppose consent; rather, they “apply unconditionally,” for the contractual device merely “explains” but does not “constitute” their obligatory force. Within this matrix, Rawls further elaborates auxiliary natural duties such as the *duty of mutual respect*, expressed in the willingness “to see the situation of others from their point of view” and to offer reasons for one’s conduct grounded in a mutually acceptable conception of justice, thereby sustaining the self-respect that social cooperation presumes. Similarly, the *duty of mutual aid* is defended not merely through prudential reciprocity but because the “public knowledge” of dependable assistance enhances the “quality of everyday life” and the trust that undergirds just social systems. Rawls’s account also extends to the duty to comply with law within a *near-just* society, where the requirement to obey even unjust laws persists so long as they do not exceed tolerable limits of injustice, for the “conflict of principles” inherent in political duty must be balanced within a regime whose basic structure is “reasonably just”. This framework culminates in his distinction between conscientious refusal and civil disobedience, the latter functioning as a principled mode of public appeal to society’s shared conception of justice, designed to stabilize a “nearly just democratic regime” by reconciling the tension between majority rule and the duty to oppose injustice. Through this multilayered

⁸ Bailey, T., and Gentile, V. (eds.), 2014, *Rawls and Religion*, New York: Columbia University Press.

⁹ Brooks, T., and Nussbaum, M. (eds.), 2015, *Rawls’s Political Liberalism*, New York: Columbia University Press

¹⁰ Freeman, S., (ed.), 2003, *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

jurisprudential edifice, Rawls transforms duty from a mere moral sentiment into a systematic, techno-legal component of democratic legitimacy and constitutional stability.¹¹

III. Michael Sandel's¹² Communitarian Duty Against Rawls's Unencumbered Morality

Michael Sandel's communitarian jurisprudence mounts a systematic critique of Rawlsian duty by rejecting the Rawlsian construction of the "unencumbered self," that abstract moral agent who, behind the veil of ignorance, is presumed capable of choosing duties and principles independently of history, attachments, and constitutive social ties. Sandel argues that such a self is metaphysically impossible and normatively impoverished, for individuals do not stand prior to their ends but are situated beings shaped by familial, civic, cultural, and historical narratives that constitute identity itself (). Against Rawls's contention that natural duties apply irrespective of voluntary acts, Sandel insists upon *special duties* grounded not in choice but in the embeddedness of the person—duties of patriotism, filial obligations, civic loyalty, and inherited commitments that arise "beyond consent" because individuals are born into social memberships that are neither optional nor detachable. In Sandel's communitarian account, the question of *what one ought to do* is inseparable from the prior question of *what stories one belongs to*, since moral agency is narratively constituted rather than contractually defined (). Thus, where Rawls imagines a procedural republic governed by the priority of the right over the good, Sandel contends that such neutrality effaces the thick moral vocabularies through which communities transmit virtues, loyalties, and solidaristic obligations. Sandel therefore views Rawls's duty of justice—premised on an autonomous chooser of principles—as an overly "procedural" morality unable to account for the ethical force of communal attachments. In its place, he posits a model where duties flow from situated membership, where the self is always already encumbered by inherited relationships that legitimately generate non-chosen moral claims. In opposing Rawls, Sandel reframes duty as historically sedimented, communally mediated, and inseparable from the concrete lifeworlds within which persons

¹¹ Hobbes, T., 1651, *Leviathan*; page reference is to the 1994 edition, E. Curley (trans.), London: Hackett; Kim, H., 2019, "An Extension of Rawls's Theory of Justice for Climate Change," *International Theory* 11(2): 160–81; Kukathas, C., (ed.), 2003, *John Rawls: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers*, 4 vol., London: Routledge;

Lloyd, S., (ed.), 1994, *John Rawls's Political Liberalism*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 75 (special double issue); Luppi, R., (ed.), 2022, *John Rawls and the Common Good*, London: Routledge; Maffettone, S., 2011, *Rawls: An Introduction*, London: Polity. Mandle, J., 2009, *Rawls's A Theory of Justice: An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹²Michael J. Sandel, *Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2009).

locate meaning, thereby challenging the Rawlsian aspiration to derive justice from an abstract, deracinated standpoint.

IV. Immanuel Kant's¹³ Conception of Duty

Immanuel Kant grounds the entire edifice of moral obligation in the a priori authority of *pure practical reason*, insisting that any genuinely moral law must be “valid morally... with absolute necessity,” deriving not from empirical inclinations but solely from concepts of reason itself. Kant distinguishes duty from all “pathological” motives—feelings, affections, or desires—arguing that actions possess moral worth only when performed “from duty” and not merely “in conformity with duty,” for inclination is inherently contingent and incapable of generating unconditional obligation. This purity is reflected in his formulation of duty as “the necessity of an action from respect for the law,” where *respect* is not an externally induced emotion but a “feeling self-effected through a concept of reason,” marking the subjection of the will to a law it autonomously legislates. Humans—distinguished from animals by their rational freedom—must act not for the sake of happiness or natural ends, for nature would have entrusted such aims to instinct; reason’s “true vocation” is instead the production of a will “good in itself,” independent of all empirical incentives. Kant therefore articulates the supreme moral principle as the requirement that one “ought never to act except so that [one] could also will that [one’s] maxim become a universal law,” an imperative that binds the rational agent universally and categorically, without regard for personal advantage or affective attachment. Thus, for Kant, duty is the juridical expression of autonomy: the rational agent is both subject and sovereign under the moral law, obligated by norms that arise from freedom and bind independently of all empirical or emotional contingencies.

V. Aristotle on Duty Teleological Reconstruction¹⁴

Aristotle’s conception of duty cannot be severed from his teleological moral architecture, in

¹³ Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998).

¹⁴ Shields, Christopher, "Aristotle", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward . Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/Aristotle>; Barnes, J., ed. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Volumes I and II, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984; Balme, D., *De Partibus Animalium I and De Generatione Animalium I*, (with passages from Book II. 1–3), translated with an introduction and notes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992; Barnes, J., *Posterior Analytics*, second edition, translated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; Bostock, D., *Metaphysics Books Z and H*, translated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; Charlton, W., *Physics Books I and II*, translated with introduction, commentary, Note on Recent Work, and revised Bibliography, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984; Graham, D., *Physics, Book VIII*, translated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

which every action, art, and choice “aims at some good,” and the *good* itself is that “at which all things aim”. For Aristotle, duty (though he does not use the modern term) is inextricably bound to the *ergon*—the characteristic work or function—of the human being, for he insists that one cannot understand what one ought to do without first understanding the *telos* or purpose of human life and of each institution, action, and capacity: “in every action and choice, it is the end involved, since it is for the sake of this that all people do everything else”. Thus, duty is not a freestanding command but the normative demand that arises from the human function as a rational and purposive being whose highest good (*eudaimonia*) consists in “an activity of soul in accord with virtue” sustained “in a complete life”. The obligatory arises when the rational part of the soul rightly orders the non-rational element—“that which heeds reason as one heeds a father”—bringing desires into concord with the judgment of the virtuous person. What we would call duty therefore manifests in the habituated pursuit of the noble (*to kalon*), for “the noble things and the just things” are the proper objects of ethical inquiry and admit of praise insofar as they express the soul’s virtues in action. Justice, especially, becomes the paradigmatic duty: an architectonic virtue through which the political art “legislates what one ought to do and what to abstain from,” aligning individual conduct with the good of the polis. Since “by nature a human being is political,” one’s duties are fulfilled not in isolation but within the communal structures that define and cultivate virtue, and the lawgiver’s task is precisely to make citizens “good and apt to do the noble things”. Thus, Aristotle’s duty is neither deontological nor based on consent; rather, it is a teleological-juridical imperative grounded in the flourishing of the rational soul, the attainment of virtue, and the realization of the human good through practices ordered toward the ends inherent in human nature and political life.¹⁵

VI. Thomas Hobbes on Duty A Sovereignty-Centric Jurisprudential Reconstruction¹⁶

In Hobbes’ political jurisprudence, the very meaning of duty is intelligible only within the

¹⁵ Kraut, R., *Politics Books VII and VIII*, translated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998; Lennox, J., *On the Parts of Animals*, translated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; Madigan, A., *Aristotle: Metaphysics Books B and K 1–2*, translated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; Makin, S., *Metaphysics Theta*, translated with an introduction and commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; Pakaluk, M., *Nicomachean Ethics, Books VIII and IX*, translated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; Robinson, R., *Politics: Books III and IV*, translated with a commentary by Richard Robinson.

¹⁶ Douglass, R. and J. Olsthoorn (eds.), 2019, *Hobbes's On the Citizen: A Critical Guide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Finkelstein, C. (ed.), 2005, *Hobbes on Law*, Aldershot: Ashgate; Hirschmann, N. and J. Wright (eds.), 2012, *Feminist Interpretations of Thomas Hobbes*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press; Lloyd, S.A. (ed.), 2012, *Hobbes Today: Insights for the 21st Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lloyd, S.A. (ed.), 2001, “Special Issue on Recent Work on the Moral and Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes”, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 82 (3&4); Martinich, A.P. and Kinch Hoekstra (eds.), 2016, *The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

architecture of the *Leviathan*, that “artificial man” whose sovereign power is the “artificial soul” giving motion and unity to the commonwealth. Hobbes roots all obligation not in natural affection or moral sentiment but in the rational necessity of self-preservation, for in the pre-political “natural condition of mankind,” where life is marked by fear, distrust, and perpetual danger, there exists “no society... and the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (context from ch. XIII). Hence the *first duty* of individuals arises through covenant: the voluntary renunciation of certain natural liberties to create an “artificial person” capable of securing peace. Duty thus flows from the laws of nature, “rules of reason” that command individuals to seek peace and fulfill their covenants; in Hobbes’ account, to break covenant is to return to war, destroying the very conditions that make duty possible (ch. XIV–XV). The civil sovereign, established by contract, becomes the authoritative interpreter of natural law and thereby the definitive source of civil duty, since rewards and punishments are the “nerves” that move every subject to “perform his duty” within the body politic. For Hobbes, the duty of obedience is absolute, for truth, justice, and reason themselves have no operative force unless unified under a common power capable of enforcing them. In the absence of such an authority, contention, sedition, and dissolution would follow, leaving humankind once again to “wander amongst innumerable absurdities” without a settled rule or common judge of right and wrong (ch. V). Thus, Hobbes’ doctrine transforms duty into a juridical imperative of submission to sovereign command, deriving legitimacy not from moral ideals but from the mechanical logic of peace, security, and the preservation of civil order.

VII. Sandel’s Theory of Justice and Duty in Comparison with Locke¹⁷

The modern communitarian critique of libertarianism, as articulated by **Michael J. Sandel**, emphasizes the moral significance of community obligations and the limits of purely

¹⁷ Filmer, Robert, 1991, *Sir Robert Filmer: Patriarcha and Other Writings*, Johann P. Sommerville (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511812644; Hooker, Richard, 1975, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, A. S. McGrade (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Locke, John, *Works*, 10 volumes, London, 1823; reprinted, Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1963. Citations are to *Works* then the volume and page number; *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, four books, Peter H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Citations are to *Essay* then book, chapter, and section; *Letter Concerning Toleration*, James Tully (ed.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983; *Two Treatises of Government*, Peter Laslett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Citations are to *Two Treatises* then treatise and section; *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*; and *On the Conduct of the Understanding*, Ruth Grant and Nathan Tarcov (eds.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1996. Citations are to *Some Thoughts* by section; *Political Essays*, Mark Goldie (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; *An Essay Concerning Toleration and Other Writings on Law and Politics, 1667–1683*, J.R. Milton and Phillip Milton (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006; Montesquieu, 1989, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Anne Cohler, Basia Miller, and Harold Stone (trans. and eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

individualistic conceptions of justice. Sandel explains the libertarian position by highlighting the doctrine of self-ownership, according to which individuals have absolute rights over their labor and property. He illustrates this argument by stating that “taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor,” because if the state claims part of a person’s income, it effectively claims part of that person’s time and labor. This reasoning reflects the libertarian belief that redistributive taxation violates individual freedom and imposes duties that should remain voluntary rather than legally enforceable. However, Sandel challenges this narrow conception of duty by arguing that justice cannot be understood solely in terms of consent or individual choice; instead, societies must consider the moral purposes of social institutions and the collective responsibilities citizens owe to one another. He therefore contends that market reasoning should not dominate all areas of life, because marketization may “corrupt or degrade the norms that define” essential social practices, thereby undermining civic virtue and social solidarity.

In contrast, the classical natural law theory of **John Locke** integrates both rights and duties within a moral framework grounded in reason and the preservation of humanity. Locke maintains that natural law imposes binding obligations on individuals, teaching that all persons are equal and independent and that “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.” His jurisprudence establishes that the fundamental law of nature is the preservation of mankind, which includes a duty to preserve others when one’s own survival is not threatened. Unlike libertarian theory, which tends to treat assistance to others as optional charity, Locke recognizes a general duty of cooperation and mutual preservation, reflecting the belief that rights exist to enable individuals to fulfill their moral responsibilities toward society. Indeed, scholars interpreting Locke emphasize that natural rights arise from natural duties, meaning that individuals possess rights precisely because they are obligated to respect the rights and welfare of others.

Thus, while Sandel critiques the libertarian rejection of compulsory social obligations and calls for recognition of communal responsibilities, Locke provides an earlier philosophical foundation for the integration of rights and duties within a system of natural law. Both thinkers reject the idea that individuals exist in isolation from society, but they differ in emphasis: Locke grounds duty in divine and rational law aimed at preserving humanity, whereas Sandel grounds duty in civic virtue, social practices, and the moral importance of community life. Their theories together illustrate the evolution of duty jurisprudence from a natural law tradition

centered on moral obligation to a modern communitarian framework concerned with social justice and the ethical limits of market individualism.

VIII. Duty Jurisprudence in Libertarian Theory: Nozick in Contrast with Locke¹⁸

The concept of duty in libertarian jurisprudence is most prominently articulated in the works of **Robert Nozick**, whose theory of self-ownership places individual autonomy at the center of moral and legal obligations. Nozick argues that each individual is the sole owner of his body and talents and is therefore entitled to pursue a “self-shaping life” free from coercive interference by the state. From this standpoint, duties are primarily **negative duties**, namely the obligation not to violate the rights of others, rather than positive duties to provide assistance. Consequently, Nozick rejects the welfare state and characterizes redistributive taxation as a form of forced labor or moral theft, asserting that the only legitimate political authority is a minimal state tasked solely with protecting individuals against force, fraud, and theft. This libertarian conception of duty sharply contrasts with the classical natural law framework developed by **John Locke**, whose jurisprudence integrates both rights and duties within a broader moral order grounded in reason and the preservation of mankind.

Locke’s theory of duty originates in the law of nature, which imposes binding moral obligations on individuals even in the absence of political authority. He maintains that human beings, as rational and equal members of a moral community, are bound by duties not to harm others in their life, liberty, or property, because all persons are considered the workmanship of a common creator. In this sense, the fundamental law of nature is the preservation of humanity, which includes both self-preservation and the preservation of others when it does not conflict with one’s own survival. As scholars interpreting Locke emphasize, natural rights in his theory are inseparable from natural duties, since rights exist to ensure that individuals can fulfill their moral obligations toward others and society. Indeed, Locke recognizes a general duty of charity and assistance toward those unable to secure their own subsistence, demonstrating that duties

¹⁸ Nozick, R., 1974 [ASU], *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, New York: Basic Books; Nozick, R., 1976, “Free Enterprise in America”, *Encyclopedia Britannica*; Nozick, R., 1978, “Who Would Choose Socialism?”, *Reason*, May 1978, 22–3; reprinted in Nozick 1997, 277–279; Nozick, R., 1981, *Philosophical Explanations*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Nozick, R., 1989, *The Examined Life*, New York: Simon & Schuster; Nozick, R., 1993, *The Nature of Rationality*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Nozick, R., 1997, *Socratic Puzzles*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Nozick, R., 2001, *Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

extend beyond mere non-interference to include limited positive responsibilities toward the welfare of others.

Furthermore, Locke's jurisprudence conceptualizes duty as an inherent feature of human nature and social cooperation rather than a mere constraint on individual freedom. His political philosophy responds to the problem of social order by asserting that human beings possess natural duties that enable peaceful civil association without the need for absolute sovereign authority. These duties arise from rational recognition of moral limits on individual action and serve to balance self-interest with responsibility to others. As one interpretation notes, Locke sought to demonstrate that individuals are morally obligated to act in ways that enhance, rather than undermine, the stability of social relations, thereby ensuring the possibility of voluntary civil society.

In contrast, Nozick deliberately departs from Locke's theological and moral foundations for duty. While influenced by Locke's notion of self-ownership, he rejects the idea that individuals possess a duty to ensure the survival or welfare of others beyond respecting their rights. In Nozick's libertarian framework, the state has no obligation to promote distributive justice or social equality, and citizens have no enforceable duty to provide assistance to those in need. Thus, the evolution from Locke to Nozick represents a significant shift in jurisprudential thought—from a duty-centered natural law tradition emphasizing mutual preservation and moral responsibility to a rights-centered libertarian model grounded in individual autonomy and minimal state authority.

IX. The Jurisprudence of Dharma: Social Responsibility, Kingship, and Moral Order¹⁹

¹⁹ I. Quotes on "Duty"

1. The Laws of Manu, I *The Laws of Manu* v. 108 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
2. The Laws of Manu, I *The Laws of Manu* v. 88 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
3. The Laws of Manu, I *The Laws of Manu* v. 89 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
4. The Laws of Manu, I *The Laws of Manu* v. 91 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
5. The Laws of Manu, II *The Laws of Manu* v. 8 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
6. The Laws of Manu, II *The Laws of Manu* v. 237 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
7. Hari Prasad Shastri, I *The Ramayana of Valmiki* 226 (Shanti Sadan, London, 1952).
8. Hari Prasad Shastri, I *The Ramayana of Valmiki* 206 (Shanti Sadan, London, 1952).
9. Hari Prasad Shastri, I *The Ramayana of Valmiki* 214 (Shanti Sadan, London, 1952).
10. Hari Prasad Shastri, II *The Ramayana of Valmiki* 137 (Shanti Sadan, London, 1957).
11. Hari Prasad Shastri, I *The Ramayana of Valmiki* 206 (Shanti Sadan, London, 1952).
12. The Laws of Manu, X *The Laws of Manu* v. 63 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
13. The Laws of Manu, VI *The Laws of Manu* v. 66 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).

In classical Hindu jurisprudence, as articulated in foundational texts such as the Manusmriti, the Ramayana, the Mahabharata, and the philosophical teachings of the Vedas and Upanishads, the concept of Dharma serves as the central organizing principle of law, morality, and social order. These texts establish a structured system of Varna-Dharma, assigning duties to different social groups based on functional roles necessary for maintaining societal stability and continuity. The Brahmana class was entrusted with intellectual and spiritual responsibilities such as teaching and studying sacred knowledge, performing religious rites, and guiding society in matters of morality and law, while the Kshatriya class was assigned the duty of protecting the people, administering justice, and maintaining public order. The Vaishya class contributed to economic welfare through agriculture, trade, and commerce, whereas the Sudra class provided essential services that supported the functioning of the social system as a whole. Within this framework, the king occupied a central position as the protector of justice and the representative of moral authority, whose legitimacy depended on his adherence to Dharma and his ability to safeguard the rights of the people, ensure fairness in legal proceedings, and protect the weak from oppression. The ethical foundation of this duty-based legal system was further

-
14. The Laws of Manu, X *The Laws of Manu* v. 97 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
 15. Hari Prasad Shastri, II *The Ramayana of Valmiki* 250 (Shanti Sadan, London, 1957).
 16. The Laws of Manu, VII *The Laws of Manu* v. 88 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
 17. The Laws of Manu, XI *The Laws of Manu* v. 236 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
 18. Hari Prasad Shastri, II *The Ramayana of Valmiki* 14 (Shanti Sadan, London, 1957).
 19. Ralph T.H. Griffith, *Hymns of the Samaveda* Bk. 1, Ch. 1, Dec. 1, v. 3 (Internet Sacred Text Archive, 1895).
 20. Ralph T.H. Griffith, *Hymns of the Samaveda* Bk. 4, Ch. 2, Dec. 3, v. 2 (Internet Sacred Text Archive, 1895).

II. Quotes on "Birth, Rebirth, Karma, and Multiple Birth"

1. The Laws of Manu, XII *The Laws of Manu* v. 3 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
2. The Laws of Manu, XII *The Laws of Manu* v. 9 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
3. Hari Prasad Shastri, I *The Ramayana of Valmiki* 208 (Shanti Sadan, London, 1952).
4. The Laws of Manu, IV *The Laws of Manu* v. 240 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
5. The Laws of Manu, VI *The Laws of Manu* v. 73 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
6. The Laws of Manu, XII *The Laws of Manu* v. 40 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
7. The Laws of Manu, I *The Laws of Manu* v. 30 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
8. The Laws of Manu, IX *The Laws of Manu* v. 8 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
9. The Laws of Manu, XII *The Laws of Manu* v. 74 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
10. The Laws of Manu, V *The Laws of Manu* v. 4 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
11. The Laws of Manu, IV *The Laws of Manu* v. 148 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
12. The Laws of Manu, XI *The Laws of Manu* v. 53 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
13. Ralph T.H. Griffith, *Hymns of the Samaveda* Bk. 4, Ch. 1, Dec. 4, v. 3 (Internet Sacred Text Archive, 1895).
14. The Laws of Manu, I *The Laws of Manu* v. 50 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
15. Arthur Anthony Macdonell, *A Vedic Reader* 17 (Oxford University Press, 1917).
16. The Laws of Manu, XII *The Laws of Manu* v. 81 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
17. The Laws of Manu, XII *The Laws of Manu* v. 22 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
18. The Laws of Manu, IV *The Laws of Manu* v. 260 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
19. The Laws of Manu, VI *The Laws of Manu* v. 85 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).
20. The Laws of Manu, XII *The Laws of Manu* v. 53 (Internet Sacred Text Archive).

reinforced by the doctrines of Karma and Samsara, which establish a moral relationship between human actions and their consequences across multiple lifetimes, emphasizing that individuals are accountable for their conduct through cycles of birth, death, and rebirth. By linking present behavior to future outcomes, these doctrines encouraged moral discipline, social responsibility, and obedience to law, thereby integrating legal authority with ethical and spiritual principles. Collectively, these concepts illustrate that ancient Hindu jurisprudence conceived justice not merely as the enforcement of rules but as the fulfillment of moral duties grounded in cosmic order, social harmony, and the pursuit of righteousness.

A central contrast between the theory of the self in the philosophy of John Rawls and Vedic jurisprudence lies in their opposing views of moral identity and obligation. Rawls, particularly in his work *A Theory of Justice*, presents the individual as a largely unencumbered moral agent capable of choosing principles of justice independently of inherited social roles, traditions, or personal talents, which he famously describes as products of a “natural lottery” that are morally arbitrary. In contrast, Vedic jurisprudence, as articulated in classical texts such as the *The Laws of Manu* and the *Ramayana*, conceives the self as fundamentally encumbered by duties (Dharma) arising from one’s birth, social role, family obligations, and cosmic order. In this framework, the individual is not free to define moral purposes independently but is bound to perform *svadharma*—the specific duties associated with one’s station in life—because moral worth is realized through faithful discharge of inherited responsibilities rather than autonomous choice. Thus, while Rawlsian liberalism emphasizes individual autonomy and neutrality of the state toward conceptions of the good, Vedic jurisprudence emphasizes duty, hierarchy, and moral embeddedness within a pre-existing social and cosmic structure, making the self inherently relational and obligation-bound rather than freely self-defining.²⁰

X. Conclusion

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the concept of duty constitutes a foundational principle in jurisprudence, moral philosophy, and social organization across diverse intellectual traditions. Through a comparative examination of the theories of **Immanuel Kant**, **John Rawls**, **Aristotle**, **Robert Nozick**, and **Michael Sandel**, alongside the normative teachings

²⁰ G. Bühler (trans.), *The Laws of Manu*, ch.1,v 108-110(Internet Sacred Text Archive), available at: <https://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/manu.htm> (last visited on Feb. 7, 2026); Swami Madhavananda (trans.), *The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad*, 4.4.5, available at: <https://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/sbe15/sbe15008.htm> (last visited on Feb. 7, 2026);

embedded in classical Hindu texts such as the **Manusmriti**, the **Vedas**, the **Mahabharata**, and the **Upanishads**, this research paper establishes that duty operates as the moral bridge between individual conduct and social order. While Western liberal thought often emphasizes autonomy, consent, and individual rights, classical and communitarian perspectives underscore the importance of moral responsibility, social roles, and the common good in shaping obligations.

The study reveals that duty is not a static or purely legal concept but a dynamic ethical principle that evolves according to cultural, philosophical, and institutional contexts. Kant's deontological framework grounds duty in universal reason and respect for moral law; Rawls articulates natural duties such as the duty of justice and mutual respect necessary for sustaining fair institutions; Aristotle situates duty within the pursuit of virtue and the realization of the common good; Nozick emphasizes individual self-ownership and minimal state interference; and Sandel highlights the socially embedded nature of moral obligations arising from community and identity. In contrast, Hindu jurisprudence conceptualizes duty through the doctrine of Dharma, which integrates moral conduct, social responsibility, and cosmic order into a unified framework of life. These perspectives collectively illustrate that duty functions as both a normative guide for personal behavior and a structural mechanism for maintaining justice and stability within society.

Ultimately, the comparative inquiry affirms that the enduring relevance of duty lies in its capacity to harmonize rights with responsibilities, freedom with obligation, and individual aspirations with collective welfare. In an era marked by complex legal and ethical challenges, the principle of duty remains indispensable for guiding governance, sustaining social cohesion, and promoting justice. The jurisprudence of duty, therefore, offers a comprehensive framework for understanding law not merely as a system of enforceable rules but as a moral enterprise grounded in responsibility, fairness, and respect for the dignity of human life.

BIBLIOGRAPHY**PRIMARY SOURCES**

- *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Peter H. Nidditch (ed.), 1975. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198243861.book.1
- *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, John W. Yolton and Jean S. Yolton (eds.), 1989. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245827.book.1
- *Drafts for the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and Other Philosophical Writings: In Three Volumes*, Vol. 1: Drafts A and B, Peter H. Nidditch and G. A. J. Rogers (eds.), 1990. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245452.book.1
- *The Reasonableness of Christianity: As Delivered in the Scriptures*, John C. Higgins-Biddle (ed.), 2000. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245254.book.1
- *An Essay Concerning Toleration: And Other Writings on Law and Politics, 1667–1683*, J. R. Milton and Philip Milton (eds.), 2006. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780199575732.book.1
- *Vindications of the Reasonableness of Christianity*, Victor Nuovo (ed.), 2012. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780199286553.book.1
- *A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul to the Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans, Ephesians*, 2 volumes, Arthur W. Wainwright (ed.)
 - volume 1, 1987. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198248019.book.1
 - volume 2, 1987. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198248064.book.1
- *Locke on Money*, 2 volumes, Patrick Hyde Kelly (ed.)
 - Volume 1, 1991. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245469.book.1
 - Volume 2, 1991,. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198248378.book.1
- *The Correspondence of John Locke*, eight volumes, E.S. de Beer (ed.)
 - *Vol. 1: Introduction; Letters Nos. 1–461*, 2010. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780199573615.book.1
 - *Vol. 2: Letters Nos. 462–848*, 1976. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245599.book.1

- *Vol. 3: Letters Nos. 849–1241,* 1978.
doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245605.book.1
 - *Vol. 4: Letters Nos. 1242–1701,* 1978.
doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245612.book.1
 - *Vol. 5: Letters Nos. 1702–2198,* 1979.
doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245629.book.1
 - *Vol. 6: Letters Nos. 2199–2664,* 1980.
doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245636.book.1
 - *Vol. 7: Letters Nos. 2665–3286,* 1981.
doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245643.book.1
 - *Vol. 8: Letters Nos. 3287–3648,* 1989.
doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198245650.book.1
- *An Early Draft of Locke’s Essay, Together with Excerpts from his Journal,* Richard I. Aaron and Jocelyn Gibb (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936.
 - *John Locke, Two Tracts of Government,* Phillip Abrams (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.
 - *Locke’s The Two Treatises of Civil Government,* Richard Ashcraft (ed.), London: Routledge, 1987.
 - [Axtell 1968], *The Educational Writings of John Locke: A Critical Edition,* James L. Axtell (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 - [Gay 1964], *John Locke on Education,* Peter Gay (ed.), New York: Bureau of Publications, Columbia Teachers College, 1964.
 - *Epistola de Tolerantia: A Letter on Toleration,* Latin text edited with a preface by Raymond Klibansky; English translation with an introduction and notes by J. W. Gough, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
 - [G&T 1996] “*Some Thoughts Concerning Education*” and “*The Conduct of the Understanding*”, Ruth W. Grant and Nathan Tarcov (eds), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1996.
 - [Laslett 1960] *Locke’s Two Treatises of Government,* Peter Laslett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

- [Woozley 1964], *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, abridged, A.D. Woozley (ed.), London: Fontana Library, 1964.
- Boyle, Robert, 1675 [1979], “Some Physico-Theological Considerations About the Possibility of the Resurrection”, in *Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle*, M.A. Stewart (ed.), New York: Manchester University Press.
- Ackrill, J., *Categories and De Interpretatione*, translated with notes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Annas, J., *Metaphysics Books M and N*, translated with a commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Aubrey, J., 1696, *Brief Lives*, in A. Clark (ed.), ‘*Brief Lives*’, *Chiefly of Contemporaries, set down by John Aubrey, between the years 1669 & 1696*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1898.
- Cudworth, R., 1678, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, London: Richard Royston.
- Descartes, R., 1641a, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (eds.), *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, vol. 2.
- Descartes, R., 1641b, Letter to Marin Mersenne for Hobbes, in N. Malcolm (ed.), *The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 94–101
- Descartes, R., 1643, Letter to Father ****, in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (eds.), *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 3.230–1
- Hobbes, T., 1640, *The Elements of Law*, in J.C.A. Gaskin (ed.) *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Hobbes, T., 1651, *Leviathan*, in E. Curley (ed.), *Leviathan, with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668*, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994.
- *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces* (1747); in Watkins, E. (ed.), 2012, *Natural Science*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755); in Watkins, E. (ed.), 2012, *Natural Science*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *Succinct Exposition of Some Meditations on Fire* (1755); in Watkins, E. (ed.), 2012, *Natural Science*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- *A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition* (1755); in Walford, D., and Meerbote, R. (eds.), 1992, *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined With Geometry, of which Sample I Contains the Physical Monadology* (1756); in Walford, D., and Meerbote, R. (eds.), 1992, *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* (1762); in Walford, D., and Meerbote, R. (eds.), 1992, *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763); in Walford, D., and Meerbote, R. (eds.), 1992, *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science* (1783); in Allison, H., and Heath, P. (eds.), 2002, *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (1784); in Zöllner, G., and Loudon, R. (eds.), 2007, *Anthropology, History, and Education*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* (1784); in Gregor, M. (ed.), 1996, *Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785); in Gregor, M. (ed.), 1996, *Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786); in Zöllner, G., and Loudon, R. (eds.), 2007, *Anthropology, History, and Education*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786); in Allison, H., and Heath, P. (eds.), 2002, *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?* (1786); in Wood, A., and di Giovanni, G. (eds.), 1996, *Religion and Rational Theology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788); in Gregor, M. (ed.), 1996, *Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790); in Guyer, P. (ed.), 2000, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1793); in Wood, A., and di Giovanni, G. (eds.), 1996, *Religion and Rational Theology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But it is of No Use in Practice* (1793); in Gregor, M. (ed.), 1996, *Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795); in Gregor, M. (ed.), 1996, *Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797); in Gregor, M. (ed.), 1996, *Practical Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798); in Wood, A., and di Giovanni, G. (eds.), 1996, *Religion and Rational Theology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798); in Zöllner, G., and Loudon, R. (eds.), 2007, *Anthropology, History, and Education*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- A selection of Kant's correspondence may be found in Zweig, A. (ed.), 1999, *Correspondence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant's unpublished *Opus Postumum* may be found in Förster, E. (ed.), 1993, *Opus Postumum*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Biographies

- King, Lord Peter, 1991, *The Life of John Locke: with extracts from his correspondence, journals, and common-place books*, Bristol: Thoemmes.
- Fox Bourne, H.R., 1876, *Life of John Locke*, 2 volumes, New York: Harper & Brothers. Reprinted Scientia Aalen, 1969.
- Cranston, Maurice, 1957, *John Locke, A Biography*, reprinted Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Woolhouse, Roger, 2007, *Locke: A Biography*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Books and Articles

- Aaron, Richard, 1937, *John Locke*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Aarsleff, Hans, 1982, *From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual History*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Aarsleff, Hans, 1994 “Locke’s Influence”, in Vere Chappell (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Locke*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 252–289. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521383714.011
- Alexander, Peter, 1985, *Ideas Qualities and Corpuscles: Locke and Boyle on the External World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnson, Monte Ransom, 2005, *Aristotle on Teleology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kraut, Richard, 1979, ‘Two Conceptions of Happiness,’ *Philosophical Review*, 88: 167–197.
- Lewis, Frank A., 2004, ‘Aristotle on the Homonymy of Being,’ *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 68: 1–36.
- Loux, Michael, 1973, ‘Aristotle on the Transcendentals,’ *Phronesis*, 18: 225–239.
- Moravcsik, J., 1975, “‘*Aitia*’ as generative factor in Aristotle’s philosophy,’ *Dialogue*, 14: 622–638.
- Owen, G. E. L., 1960, ‘Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle,’ in I. During and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), *Plato and Aristotle in the Mid-Fourth Century*, Göteborg: Almqvist and Wiksell, pp. 163–190.
- Haugeland, J., 1985, *Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Holden, T., 2023, *Hobbes’s Philosophy of Religion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hungerland, I.C., and G.R. Vick, 1981, “Hobbes’s Theory of Language, Speech, and Reasoning”, in T. Hobbes, *Part I of De Corpore*, New York: Abaris Books, pp. 7–169.
- Jackson, Nicholas D., 2007, *Hobbes, Bramhall, and the Politics of Liberty and Necessity: A Quarrel of the Civil Wars and Interregnum*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Jesseph, D., 1998, “Leibniz on the Foundations of the Calculus: The Question of the Reality of Infinitesimal Magnitudes”, *Perspectives on Science*, 6: 6–40.
- Jankowiak, T., 2017, “Kantian Phenomenalism Without Berkeleyan Idealism,” *Kantian Review*, 22(2): 205–231.
- Kanterian, E., 2018, *Kant, God, and Metaphysics*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Kemp Smith, N., 1923, *Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, New York: Humanities Press, 2nd edition (1992 reprint).
- Kitcher, P. (ed.), 1998, *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Critical Essays*, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.