# WEAPONIZING SPACE: MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE & LEGAL CHALLENGES

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#### **ABSTRACT**

Outer space, once considered a proper area for scientific peaceful exploration, has increasingly come to be contested over strategic frontiers. Brought in the faction of the United States and Russia and China, nations have invented advanced space-based military technologies that include antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, space missile defense systems, and surveillance satellites with dual-use capabilities. They raise serious questions as to how militarization and weaponization of space. Most of the international treaties, such as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, are meant to prevent militarization of outer space; such treaties, however, do not have requisite mechanisms for enforcement, thus leaving gaps in the governance of space security. This paper addresses the legal and geopolitical challenges of space weaponization, analyzing existing legal frameworks, technological advances, and emerging threats to space security. It argues that without more effective international legal regulation of space and stronger international cooperation, space could become the next battlefield in escalating global conflicts and threats to peaceful space activities, and might thus find itself ultimately by taken over by an aggressor. In this respect, it indicates potential reforms in international space law so that outer space remains a peaceful domain for scientific and commercial exploration.

**Keywords:** Space weaponization, militarization, international law, Outer Space Treaty, anti-satellite weapons, space security.

#### 1. Introduction

Outer space has long been viewed as a realm of scientific discovery and peaceful cooperation. However, as technology advances, nations have increasingly sought to extend their military capabilities beyond Earth's atmosphere. The use of satellites for intelligence gathering, communication, and missile defense has made space a critical domain for national security. Furthermore, the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, space-based missile defense systems, and directed-energy weapons raises concerns about the potential for an arms race in space.

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The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, widely considered the foundation of international space law, establishes the principle that outer space shall be used for "peaceful purposes" and prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in orbit<sup>1</sup>. However, the treaty does not explicitly prohibit the deployment of conventional weapons or military assets in space, leading to legal ambiguities that nations have exploited. The growing involvement of private corporations, such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, further complicates the landscape by introducing non-state actors into space security considerations.

This paper explores the legal and geopolitical challenges associated with the militarization of space. It examines how existing treaties regulate space activities, analyzes recent developments in space-based military technology, and evaluates the implications of space weaponization for international peace and security. Finally, it proposes potential legal reforms to address the gaps in international space law.

# 2. Historical Development of Space Militarization

#### 2.1 The Cold War and the Space Race

The militarization of outer space began in the Cold War period. The United States, as well as the Soviet Union, competed against each other for domination in space exploration and military technology. The launch of Sputnik 1 by the Soviet Union in 1957 became the starting point of the space race, demonstrating the potential that satellites have for military surveillance and

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm l}$  https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html (Accessed on 15.03.2025)

communication.

Both superpowers developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and space-based reconnaissance systems during the Cold War. The US came up with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or "Star Wars" in 1983, a space-based missile defense system. It was a landmark project that was never realized but laid down a path for future military space programs<sup>2</sup>.

# 2.2 Post-Cold War Developments

Following the Cold War, space became increasingly militarized as technological advancements allowed for the deployment of high-resolution surveillance satellites, early-warning systems, and GPS-guided weaponry. The 21st century has seen a resurgence of military space activities, particularly with the development of ASAT weapons by China (2007), India (2019), and Russia (2021).

# 3. International Legal Framework Governing Outer Space

The governance of outer space is primarily dictated by international treaties, agreements, and United Nations resolutions that establish rules for the peaceful use of space. However, many of these legal instruments were created during the Cold War, when space technology was less advanced, and they fail to address the modern realities of military space programs, space-based weapons, and commercial space activities. This section explores the key legal frameworks governing outer space, highlighting their strengths, limitations, and areas that require reform.

#### 3.1 The Outer Space Treaty (1967)

Commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty (OST), the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, has become the fundamental treaty of international space law. Formally adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the treaty itself came into force in 1967, establishing guidelines for activities conducted in space with an eye toward preventing space from becoming militarized. Today, the count of the countries which signed the treaty

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-06/features/unfinished-business-russia-and-missile-defense-under-clinton (Accessed on 15.03.2025)

stands at 114, which include major global space-faring nations such as the United States, Russia, China, and India.

It is one of its important provisions under the Articles I & IV which emphasize the outer space utilization for peaceful purposes. It states that activity on space must be for the benefits of all the countries; and prohibits totally the introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, on celestial bodies, or anywhere in outer space. Another important provision Article II establishes the Non-Sovereignty Principle which states that no nation can lay claim to the ownership of the Moon, planets or any celestial body. This principle was meant to avoid conflict which could arise through the claim of territory in space. Articles Vi & VII also hold the nations liable for the activities conducted by their government and private entities in space. If a country launches an object that causes damages, then it has international liability upon consequences.

It provides, too, a prohibition of military bases and weapon testing on celestial bodies by Article IV; and though it prohibits the establishment of military installations, fortifications and weapons testing, it does not prohibit the use of military personnel in the performance of peaceful scientific research, leaving open the possibilities for military involvement in space under the guise of scientific exploration.

The treaty is, however, anything but complete; in its most glaring shortcoming, it does not expressly prohibit conventional weapons in space-the OST only prohibits WMDs, which means that conventional military weapons such as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, laser systems, and kinetic energy weapons do not fall within the explicit restriction. There is another aspect that the treaty lacks, as it does not possess enforcement mechanism; no penalties or legal consequences follow violations of the treaty, leaving the compliance voluntary rather than mandatory. Another major problem is its ambiguous definitions, especially regarding the term "peaceful use", which allows countries to justify military activities as "defensive", hence creating loopholes for possible space militarization.

An instrumental reference in law of terrestrial spaces is the Outer Space Treaty; but loopholes and archaic clauses have raised alarm bells with regard to the prospect of weaponization of space and military satellites. With the ever-increasing pace of technological advancement in military space, many have sought the urgency to come up with new legal frameworks for.

#### 3.2 The Moon Agreement (1984)

The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, known popularly as the Moon Agreement (1984), was sponsored by the United Nations in 1979 and came into force in 1984. The Agreement was crafted to further implement the Outer Space Treaty by formulating additional legal parameters governing exploration and use of celestial bodies for ensuring peace and cooperation in space endeavors.<sup>3</sup>

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Military use of the Moon and other celestial bodies is one of its major provisions as specified in Article III, which spells out a ban on a military presence. Weapons, military bases, or military exercises would not be allowed to be stationed or carried on the Moon, reiterated the notion that 'space should be for peaceful purposes only.' Another major provision of Article XI affirms that the resources of the Moon shall be considered as the common heritage of mankind. In other words, no state or corporation could claim ownership of lunar resources. This provision aims to guarantee the fair distribution of space resources among all states. The Agreement also provides for international regulation of future lunar mining and resource extraction in order to mitigate any potential future conflicts and to promote equitable distribution.

However, the agreement was not without its limitations. The lack of participation is problematic, with only 18 countries having ratified it, none of them major space powers like the United States, Russia, China, and India. Like the vast majority of other space treaties, it lacks any clear enforcement mechanisms or punishment for violations. Perhaps the most serious flaw arises from its outdated provisions, as it did not take into account any new arrangements proposed after the emergence of private space companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, thus failing to address many challenges posed by commercial lunar exploration. Consequently, due to these shortcomings, it is widely viewed that the Moon Agreement cannot adequately offer regulation over contemporary military and commercial activities on celestial bodies.

#### 3.3 The UN Resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)

The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that seeks to prevent the militarization of space. It was first

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg\_no=XXIV-2&chapter=24&clang=\_en (Accessed on 15.03.2025)

introduced in 1981 and has been reaffirmed multiple times in UN discussions<sup>4</sup>.

**Key Objectives of PAROS** 

The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) resolution aims at preventing the weaponization of outer space by calling for a prohibition on all types of space-based weapons, whether conventional weapons, kinetic weapons, or directed-energy weapons. It emphasizes the need to keep space a peaceful place by the prohibition of military developments that could

potentially lead to conflicts that are beyond Earth.

The resolution aims to promote international cooperation in matters of space security that could contribute toward confidence-building and disarmament. More transparency, communication, and diplomatic efforts among space-faring nations would be promoted to de-escalate tensions

and settle misunderstandings before they grow into an international confrontation.

A very important component of PAROS is calling for a legally binding international treaty that will expressly exclude all military activities from space. The resolution implores the international community to develop a comprehensive legal framework that provides sufficient guarantees exceeding the limits of any existing instruments to ensure everlasting peace and

security for outer space.

**Limitations of PAROS** 

PAROS, like any other UN resolution, does not legally bind any state. The world has its kings under its religions. Disinterest from Powers: The US has been a repeated opponent of PAROS, stating that current treaties (OST, for example) provide sufficient basis. Failure to Prevent ASAT Weapons Development: Despite PAROS or common discussions, both China and Russia, followed by India and the US, have test fired ASAT missiles, demonstrating the lack of any impact from this resolution. While PAROS is a positive initiative by satellite countries,

it has not actually produced legally binding commitments from such nations.

3.4 The Liability Convention (1972)

The Liability Convention, officially referred to as the Convention on International Liability for

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-prevention-arms-race-space-paros-treaty/ (Accessed on 15.03.2025)

Damage Caused by Space Objects, was endorsed in 1972 by the United Nations for forming the liability rules for damages owing to the implication of space objects. A very important provision of liability as stated in Article II says that any damage on Earth caused by a space object makes the launching state liable and does not hold any insertion of fault; however, if a damaged object is another space object in orbit, then Article III comes forward and makes that the liability does not reflect absolute liability. Further, this convention talks about the procedure of claims related to incidents due to space a party so affected may file for claims under this convention and claim damages due to space activities<sup>5</sup>.

The liability convention has some inherent problems even after it stands so important. It's basically meant for damage which is accidental rather than combat, deliberate attack or attacking spacecraft; it has no enforcement mechanism since the UN has no power to do so with liability judgments, and the jurisdiction for compliance is really from diplomatic negotiation between countries. While all of this happens, it also reveals the evolving nature of problems faced by space activities and necessitates a better legal framework to address whatever new problems arise in that regard.

#### **Limitations of the Liability Convention**

- It does not address military conflicts: The convention was designed to handle accidental damage, not intentional attacks or space warfare.
- No enforcement mechanism: The United Nations does not have the authority to enforce liability rulings<sup>6</sup>.

#### 4. Current Trends in Space Weaponization

Space militarization has surged vigorously lately with, amongst many others, various nations' own development and testing of advanced anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, directed-energy weapons (DEWs), hypersonic missile systems, and space-based surveillance technologies. These advancements carry considerable risks to global security, increased possibilities of a space arms race, geopolitical tensions, and conflicts that can extend beyond the earth's atmosphere. Among the worst trends is the growing expansion of ASAT weapons to disable or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-13264-3\_11 (Accessed on 15.03.2025)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-13264-3 11 (Accessed On 15.03.2025)

destroy enemy satellites, disturbing vital communication, navigation, and military operations. Testing was conducted by such countries as China, India, Russia, and the USA, which are indicating their capacity to engage in space warfare. One of the most prominent is China's ASAT test in 2007, which obliterated a defunct weather satellite, producing almost 3,000 pieces of space debris, which are still orbiting the planet and represent a continued collision risk for operational satellites. In turn, India completed its Mission Shakti, which destroyed a low-earth orbit satellite with the help of a direct-ascent ASAT missile.

Escalation continued with Russia's ASAT test in 2021 which left a debris cloud that endangered the ISS and various satellites. Such events have shown how dangerous ASAT weapons can be: space debris caused by their tests could remain in orbit for many decades and threaten even civilian and military activities in space. Another worrying development is that of directed-energy weapons (DEWs), which include high-power lasers and microwave weapons used to disable or blind enemy satellites without producing debris. While such armament would be less damaging in physical terms, their hidden nature makes them extremely destabilizing, allowing them to be used in schemes of espionage, cyber warfare, and the pursuit of space dominance. The United States, China, and Russia are all engaged in some arena of space-based weaponization research and development of the laser variety that could interfere with enemy reconnaissance and observation satellites. With the United States, Russia, and China at the forefront of developing hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), missiles that travel faster than Mach 5, the arms race has reached renewed zeal.

These hypersonic systems pose overwhelming military advantages when fused with space-based tracking and targeting satellites, permitting nations to strike their foes with precision and speed. Further, the space-based missile defense systems, such as the ones the United States is proposing with satellite constellations for missile tracking, reveal how space-based assets are merging with terrestrial warfare strategies. Another noticeable tendency is the increasing manner in which dual-use technology has gone on when civilian satellites serve both commercial and military purposes. Companies like SpaceX, Amazon, and Blue Origin are sending off vast satellite networks such as Starlink, which while providing global broadband coverage has great potential for supply military communication and intelligence operations. This most worrying theme of having private space assets couple with military defense strategies poses legal and ethical dilemmas should these commercial entities become the foci in some

future space conflict<sup>7</sup>.

To add to these concerns are the reports of nations developing co-orbital weapons-fuzes that can maneuver closely next to enemy satellites, disabling or destroying them through robotic arms, explosive payloads, or cyber-attacks. Satellite proximity operations have been demonstrated by the United States, Russia, and China, giving rise to speculation that such technologies will be put to use in more offensive military means, all cloaked under the auspices of routine satellite servicing missions. In response to these emerging threats, several countries have established dedicated space military units, such as the United States Space Force (USSF), China's Strategic Support Force (SSF), and Russia's Aerospace Forces, all of which focus on developing military capabilities in space<sup>8</sup>. The European Union and NATO have also recognized space as a strategic domain, further reinforcing the idea that outer space is becoming a battlefield for military dominance. These developments indicate that space weaponization is no longer a hypothetical scenario but a reality that is shaping the future of warfare. However, the lack of strong international regulations, loopholes in existing treaties, and geopolitical rivalries continue to drive this dangerous arms race in space. Without significant legal and diplomatic efforts to establish new binding treaties and arms control agreements, the risk of space conflicts, satellite disruptions, and even potential kinetic warfare in space will continue to grow, threatening the stability of global security and the sustainability of space operations.

#### 5. Legal Challenges in Preventing Space Weaponization

Preventing the weaponization of space faces many legal challenges. Existing space laws were created decades ago and have not evolved to address modern military advancements. The loopholes and vague language in these treaties make it difficult to enforce regulations, allowing countries to continue developing space-based weapons.

# 5.1 Loopholes in the Outer Space Treaty

The Outer Space Treaty (OST) is the foundation of international space law, but it has many gaps. It bans only weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in space, such as nuclear weapons, but does not prohibit conventional weapons like anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, lasers, or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> https://www.captechu.edu/blog/amazon-and-spacex-strategic-partnership-space-internet (Accessed on 15.03.2025)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4120977/space-force-and-air-force-leaders-discuss-missile-defense-strategy-amid-growing/ (Accessed on 15.03.2025)

kinetic energy weapons. This loophole allows countries to develop and deploy military technologies in space without violating the treaty.

#### 5.2 Lack of Enforcement Mechanisms

One of the biggest problems in space law is the lack of enforcement. There is no international body with the power to punish countries that violate space treaties. Even if a nation places weapons in space, there is no legal penalty or military action that can force them to stop. This makes space treaties more of moral agreements rather than strict, enforceable laws.

### 5.3 Absence of Regulations for New Technologies

When space laws were created in the 1960s and 1970s, there were no cyber weapons, AI-controlled satellites, or hypersonic missiles. Today, these technologies play a huge role in military space programs, yet there are no international regulations controlling them. Cyberattacks on satellites, space-based surveillance, and AI-driven military operations are growing threats that remain legally unaddressed.

#### **5.4 Rising Role of Private Companies**

Another legal challenge is the involvement of private space companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Amazon's Project Kuiper. These companies launch satellites, provide military support, and even work on space-based missile defense. However, existing treaties focus only on countries, not private entities. This raises concerns about how private corporations should be regulated if they engage in military-related space activities.

#### 5.5 Geopolitical Rivalries and Lack of Consensus

The United States, Russia, China, and India have competing interests in space. These countries are reluctant to sign new treaties that could limit their military capabilities. Any new space agreement requires international cooperation, but growing geopolitical tensions make this difficult. For example, while the United Nations promotes space arms control, major space-faring nations either oppose or delay these efforts to maintain their military advantage<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/the-us-india-initiative-on-critical-and-emerging-technology-icet-from-2022-to-2025-assessment-learnings-and-the-way-forward?center=india&lang=en (Accessed on 15.03.2025)

#### 5.6 Need for a New Legal Framework

To prevent space from becoming a battlefield, the world needs a **new legal framework** that clearly defines **what is allowed and what is banned**. Future treaties must include **binding commitments**, **enforcement mechanisms**, **and specific rules for new technologies**. Without such measures, space will continue to be militarized, increasing the risk of conflicts and threatening global security.

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# 6. The Future of Space Security and Arms Control

The realization of space security in this century will rely on the manner in which nations deal with military capabilities, legal frameworks, and international cooperation. The militarization of space could become full-blown conflict without distinct agreements and responsible behavior in space, creating infinite loss arrays involving global security, contradictory satellite communications, and space exploration. As military technologies continue to evolve, it is high time that binding regulations, diplomatic agreements, and verification mechanisms are hammered out by the international community. There is no more time to lose if space is to remain a domain for peaceful purposes as opposed to being transformed into yet another extension of warfare.

#### 6.1 Growing Risk of a Space Arms Race

Countries such as the United States, China, and Russia are competing to develop advanced space-based weapons, anti-satellite (ASAT) systems, missile defense technologies, and cyber warfare capabilities. This growing competition has increased concerns about a potential space arms race, where nations continuously expand their military presence in space to counter perceived threats from rivals. Such developments could lead to a security dilemma, where defensive measures by one country are seen as offensive threats by others, triggering an endless cycle of military expansion. If unchecked, this arms race could result in more frequent satellite attacks, weaponized spacecraft, and the risk of direct military confrontations in orbit, threatening the stability of international relations<sup>10</sup>.

 $<sup>^{10}\</sup> https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2023.2277253\ (Accessed\ on\ 15.03.2025)$ 

#### 6.2 The Role of the United Nations and International Bodies

The United Nations and other organizations in charge of outer space security issues, prevention of outer space weaponization, etc. have been pushing to have such negotiations concluded in an agreement that bans the use of any space-based weaponry, ASATs, and militarized satellite constellations. In a continuous appeal made at the Convention on Disarmament and UNOOSA, states have to negotiate new treaties that would prevent deploying space-based weapons, ASAT systems, and militarized satellite constellations. Nevertheless, the proposed PAROS treaty was unsuccessful due to its rejection by leading members of space, especially by the USA; such treaties would limit its military capability for defense. This lack of consensus regarding binding space arms control agreements mirrors the challenge of balancing national security interests with the aim of establishing outer space as a peaceful one.

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### **6.3 Proposals for a New Space Treaty**

A few observers argue for an entirely new international space treaty that takes into account the updated security concerns because the existing one-the Outer Space Treaty (OST)-and some other regulations impose limits on them. It should:- Ban all types of space weapons and not only weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) but also weapons of any sort that may be used in orbit;- Ensure that there are restrictions on the militarization of satellites, space weapons, and cyber war techniques;- Set up strict verification and enforcement measures whereby international bodies can oversee compliance and impose penalties on states failing to abide by it;- Address private space companies' roles in military operations, making sure that corporations like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Amazon cannot develop or deploy military-type space assets without international oversight. Though such a treaty might go a long way toward reducing the chances of space wars, its success would depend on whether the major space powers are going to accede to it and implement it. Agreed upon on this are currently a big diplomatic hurdle in light of the contemporary geopolitical configuration.

#### 6.4 The Impact of Commercial Space Activities

Private space companies engage in an increasingly important way in communicating, launching satellites, and some other military-related tasks. SpaceX (Starlink)<sup>11</sup>, Blue Origin, and Amazon

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> https://www.space.com/spacex-starlink-satellites.html (Accessed on 15.03.2025)

(Project Kuiper)<sup>12</sup> are sending countless satellites into orbit to provide, among other things, worldwide Internet coverage, a military-compatible communication network, and satellite reconnaissance. Many technologies, which can be divided into different categories, have dualuse characteristics, meaning they can be used for commercial or military purposes. Wariness is engendered in the presence of military and intelligence-related actions conducted by private companies, especially when it comes to how these actions were, are, or will be regulated under

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# 6.5 Space as a Conflict Prevention Zone

Many experts instead combine their efforts into promoting space as a zone of peace and international cooperation, rather than turning it into a battlefield. Joint scientific research projects, space exploration, and international security may help avoid military escalation. The ISS, alongside various multinational satellite programs, provides handy proofs of what cooperation in outer space could mean For its sake, some experts propose to set some Global Space Security Council, which would enforce space law and mediate disputes, akin to UNSC, the UN Security Council. Launching attempts to reduce tensions between the states might merely consist of a few transparency and information-sharing ways combined with some measures to build the trust needed for peaceful cooperation in space.

international law. If commercial satellites become military targets in future conflicts, a wide

Web and navigation network will be badly disrupted and world security will be jeopardized.

Nations must create clear guidance outlining the military use of commercial space assets to

prevent private companies from furthering the weaponization of space.

#### 6.6 The Need for Urgent Action

The fast development of such hypersonic missiles, directed-energy weapons, and anti-satellite systems point to a pressing need to tackle challenges in space security. The urgency for action is acute: otherwise, military conflicts in space, cyber-attacks on satellites, and large-scale destruction of space infrastructure may ever reemerge. Given that in modern economies, satellites are mostly relied on for communication, navigation, finance, and military, any space conflicts may have very harsh repercussions for the world. Countries must quicken their negotiations toward new treaties on the effective establishment of international monitoring

 $<sup>^{12}\</sup> https://www.aboutamazon.in/news/devices/amazon-project-kuiper-satellite-network (Accessed on 15.03.2025)$ 

mechanisms that would strengthen already existing space law so as to keep utmost faction and security in outer space. Today's decisions will dictate whether space will be a domain of peaceful conduct toward one another in exploration and scientific growth or a new frontier in war and destruction. Global cooperation and strong legal frameworks, coupled with diplomatic efforts, are paramount to a secure and sustainable future for outer space activities.

#### 7. The Future of Space Warfare and Strategic Stability

As more and more countries develop and advance their military presence in space, hardly anything can be said about the future of space warfare and strategic stability. Increasing reliance upon satellite technology, space-based defensive systems, and ASAT weapons indicates that future wars will be fought in space. The delicate balance between national security interests and the international interests of cooperation and legal regulations will prove to be a very difficult problem to solve. Without reasonable limitations, space is destined to become the most highly contested battlefield on earth whose use will increase global instability, cyber warfare, and large-scale disruptions to critical infrastructure. However, with the right policies, treaties, and diplomacy, the future of outer space can be directed toward peaceful exploration and technological advancement rather than military confrontation.

#### 7.1 The Evolution of Space-Based Weapons

In future wars, directed-energy weapons, kinetic-kill vehicles, AI-controlled autonomous satellites, and cyber warfare capabilities will likely develop. Countries are already developing hypersonic missiles, space-based missile defense systems, and electromagnetic pulse weapons able to disable satellites. Directed-energy weapons such as lasers and microwaves could be used to blind or disable enemy satellites, calling their use in future conflicts into even greater question. A kinetic ASAT weapon could physically destroy satellites to create space debris, which creates a danger for all other space operations. Cyber warfare tactics are a perfect fit for hacking enemy satellites, disrupting communications, or otherwise manipulating GPS systems. AI-controlled unmanned military satellite systems could track, intercept, and destroy threats autonomously in real time. Such developments suggest that future wars may not be fought only on Earth but, just as hugely and more dangerously, also in space, thereby affecting the future of global security dramatically.

# 7.2 The Risk of Full-Scale Space Conflicts

As space becomes increasingly militarized, there is a heightened risk of full-out warfare in orbit. Preemptive strikes against enemy satellites could disable communications, surveillance, and navigation systems. Consequences of such conflicts would include the following: Massive disruption of communication networks affecting global business, financial markets, and everyday internet services; Navigation failures affecting both civilian and military aviation, shipping routes, and emergency response operations; Uncontrollable space debris that would render certain orbits unusable for decades and pose a threat to future space missions; Eclectic range for possible escalation on Earth, as countries retaliate from space-based attacks by conventional or nuclear strikes. Without appropriate regulations, space warfare can become that dangerous destabilizing security factor prompting nations towards more aggressive defense policies.

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# 7.3 The Role of Artificial Intelligence and Automation in Space Security

AI and automation will be a fundamental part of space security and military strategies. A number of countries have decided to contribute to this by investing in massively AI-powered surveillance satellites, autonomous defense systems, and technologies to prevent cyber-attacks. AI can surveil the space area to predict the movement of the enemy and take decisions on strategizing. Automated satellites could respond to any threats on their own, including missile launches or satellite jamming attempts<sup>13</sup>. Machine learning optimizes cybersecurity by enabling the real-time detection of hacking attempts on space systems. On the upside, implementation of AI-driven defense systems means efficiency would be improved and human error curtailed; but on the downside, a plethora of ethical issues will arise. Excessive reliance on autonomous military decision-making could lead to unintended escalation and conflict, particularly when AI correctly perceives a threat or is somehow misled in the throes of a crisis.

### 7.4 New Challenges in Space Governance

Advanced technologies of space warfare will give rise to serious challenges impeding the implementation of existing space laws and treaties in the wake of rapid military developments. Although the OST and other related agreements were and are designed to uphold peace in space

 $<sup>^{13}</sup>https://www.esa.int/Enabling\_Support/Preparing\_for\_the\_Future/Discovery\_and\_Preparation/Artificial\_intelligence\_in\_space (Accessed on 15.03.2025)$ 

militarization and legal loopholes.

activities, they do not adequately lay down firm regulations for the newly emerging military technologies. There are no binding prohibitions against conventional weapons in space, permitting nations the unrestrained capacity to develop offensive capabilities. The private space companies' militarization is also not addressed enough, raising alarm bells over the extent of corporate involvement in defense strategy. The mechanisms for enforcing space law are weak, so punishing nations for violating agreements is difficult. Either create regulation on allocative issues of AMAIW, cyber warfare, and use of space resources for military purposes in the form of new international treaties, or space security remains exposed to unbridled

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### 7.5 Future Diplomatic Efforts to Prevent Space Conflicts

Diplomatic initiatives can yet contribute to the prevention of conflicts in space, despite the increasing risks. Decisions made today about how nations cooperate to develop binding treaties that would curb the militarization of space will define the surface. Some possible diplomatic arrangements: A global treaty to ban all forms of weapons in space, establishing it as a peaceful realm; An international space council that may function like the United Nations Security Counsel to settle conflicts and enforce some rules; Transparency and other confidence-building measures, such as public announcements of military-space programs and joint inspections of space objects; Collaborating on space missions, thereby de-escalating military tensions when grounded by scientific and commercial partnerships. In prioritizing diplomacy over military rivalry, the countries can further reduce a chance of conflict while safeguarding space as a common resource of humanity.

# 7.6 Space as the New Frontier of Strategic Competition

"During the coming decades, space will turns into not just a military platform but the word of contention in economic and scientific fields between the great powers. It is very probable that control over space resources including the satellite system networks and logistic systems will provide great geopolitical advantages. The Moon and asteroids could emerge as future strategic spots to contend over mining rights and resource extractions. Solar energy and advanced communication technologies will reshape the locus of energy and infrastructure. Military alliances will extend into space: states build coalitions to strengthen their defense. The concept of war in the universe is not limited to combating and defending, but the contest over space

will determine the countries which dominate the global power structures in the 21st century."

# 7.7 Ensuring a Peaceful and Secure Future in Space

Though militarization of space certainly carries a set of enormous risks, a future of peace and security still seems possible, with good governance, diplomatic cooperation, and technological safeguards. What really happens to space security would depend on: Military defense being balanced by legal regulation ever to put a stop to a rampant arms race; Global cooperation in space exploration so that peaceful relations do not suffer at the hand of military competition; High-quality protection of cybernetic systems to ensure that cyber threats do not reach space infrastructure; And peaceful initiatives through the involvement of private companies so that commercial conditions do not lead to militarization but rather ensure global stability. The international community can take care now to ensure that space does not become the next battlefield, which would deny future generations a sphere of discovery, cooperation, and innovation.

#### 8. Conclusion

The militarization of outer space is no longer a distant possibility—it is an unfolding reality. While international treaties like the Outer Space Treaty (OST), the Liability Convention, and the Moon Agreement were established to maintain space as a peaceful domain, they lack strong enforcement mechanisms and fail to address modern military advancements. The absence of clear prohibitions on conventional weapons, the increasing deployment of military satellites, and the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons indicate that nations are actively preparing for strategic dominance in space. If left unchecked, this trend could lead to an arms race beyond Earth's atmosphere, heightening global tensions and increasing the risk of conflicts spilling over into space.

Despite these concerns, diplomatic efforts and international cooperation can still play a crucial role in preventing the full-scale weaponization of space. Strengthening existing treaties, establishing a legally binding framework that explicitly bans all forms of space-based weaponry, and promoting confidence-building measures among space-faring nations are essential steps toward maintaining long-term space security. The role of private space companies, such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and defense contractors, further complicates space governance, making it necessary for global regulatory bodies to oversee commercial activities

and prevent corporate-driven militarization.

Looking ahead, the future of space will be determined by the choices nations make today. If space remains a domain of scientific exploration, technological innovation, and peaceful cooperation, humanity will benefit immensely. However, if space becomes another battleground for military dominance, the consequences could be catastrophic—not just for space security but for global stability on Earth. The international community must act proactively and collectively to ensure that outer space remains a frontier of peace, discovery, and unity rather than a theater of war.

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